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COLORADO v. CONNELLY:* THE GRATUITOUS
UNION OF VOLUNTARINESS AND STATE
COERCION
The concept of voluntariness is the bedrock of modern confession law' . A voluntary confession 2 must be the product of the suspect's free will and rational choice. s Involuntary confessions are
inadmissible as evidence not only because of their unreliability,4 but
also because their use violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.8 The importance of this concept, however, is
surpassed by its ambiguity.' Although several centuries of AngloAmerican confession law have seasoned the concept of voluntariness,7 a precise methodology for the determination of voluntariness
*

107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).

1. Confession law and voluntariness should not be confused with the privilege
against self-incrimination. M. BERGER, TAKING THE FiFTH 100 (1980). The privilege
against self-incrimination involves the defendant's right to remain silent during official proceedings without fear of being held in contempt. Id. Voluntariness, however,
concerns a suspect's rights during extrajudicial interrogation. Id.
2. A confession is an extrajudicial, "express statement admitting some essential
part of the evidence charged, going directly to evidence of guilt." J. WIGMORE, LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 204, at 212 (1935). Confessions are distinguished from "admissions"
which consist of an "admission or acknowledgement of a fact or facts tending to
prove guilt but falling short of an admission to all essential elements of the crime."
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 362 (3d ed. 1984).
3. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 804 (1970); Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293, 307 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583 (1961); Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207-08 (1960).
4. Although for centuries voluntariness was synonymous with reliability, Y.
KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 553-54 (5th ed. 1980) [hereinafter CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE], the United States Supreme Court, in Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534
(1961), held that voluntariness must be determined without regard for the trustworthiness of the confession. Id. at 544. While reliability cannot be weighed in a determination of voluntariness, the objective of ensuring the reliability of evidence remains
part of the rationale underlying the voluntariness doctrine. Lederer, The Law of Confessions-The Voluntariness Doctrine, 74 MIL. L. REV. 67, 69 (1974). See also Dix,
Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions,
WASH. U.L.Q. 275, 291 (1975).
5. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936).
6. The critical role of voluntariness in criminal procedure is reflected by the fact
that any conviction based on evidence which includes an involuntary confession will
be automatically reversed regardless of the significance of the remaining evidence.
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401,
404 (1945). This rule ensures due process in official proceedings and "deters the prosecution from supplementing other evidence by introducing a confession of questionable validity in order to secure a conviction." Y. KAMISAR, What Is An Involuntary
Confession?, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1 (1980).
7. The concept of voluntariness is deeply rooted in English common law. McCORMICK, supra note 2, at 372; Dix, supra note 4, at 279; Developments in Law-
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continues to elude legal scholars. In Colorado v. Connelly,s the
United States Supreme Court again attempted to clarify the standards for the admissibility of confessions by predicating involuntariness on police coercion. The Court addressed the issue of whether a
defendant's deficient mental state, in the absence of police coercion,
renders a confession involuntary under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.9 The Court held that police coercion is necessary for a finding of involuntariness 0 and that a defendant's
mental state alone is never dispositive of the due process inquiry."
Confessions, 79 HARv. L. REv. 935, 954 (1966) [hereinafter Confessions]. Prior to the
adoption of the voluntariness rule in the English courts, confessions were admissible
regardless of the method of extraction. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, at 372. As a result,
until the mid-1600's, even torture was accepted as a method of persuasion. Confessions, supra, at 954. In The King v. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160 (K.B. 1775), the English
Court manifested an unwillingness to use confessions elicited by threat or promise.
Id. at 161. Finally, in The King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783), the
English Court held that a "confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or,
by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered as
the evidence of guilt that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is rejected." Id. at 235. The rationale for this holding was the belief that improperly induced confessions were not reliable and, due to the strong evidence of guilt afforded
by a confession, reliability must be ensured. Confessions, supra, at 954. The original
objective of the voluntariness doctrine, then, was to ensure the reliability of evidence.
In order to assess the reliability of a confession, the English courts determined
whether the confession was "voluntarily" offered. Id. at 955. Almost any inducement,
with the exception of deception, could render a confession involuntary and automatically exclude a confession from admission into evidence regardless of its potential
reliability. Id.
The American courts adopted the English evidentiary rule of voluntariness with
certain alterations. Dix, supra note 4, at 284. Rather than automatically excluding an
improperly induced confession, the American courts attempted to assess the reliability of the statements. Id. The initial willingness of the American courts to dabble
with the tricky question of reliability, instead of following the strict exclusionary rule
of the English courts, represents the emergence of the confusion and unpredictability
that continues to pervade confession law.
In 1884, in its first confession case, the United States Supreme Court formally
adopted the voluntariness doctrine. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). The Court
recognized the doctrine as a part of federal evidence law, having no constitutional
implications. Id. at 583-85. The Hopt Court held that confessions were not admissible
if the confession
appears to have been made either in consequence of inducements of a temporal nature, held out by one in authority, touching the charge preferred, or because of a threat or promise by or in the presence of such person, which, operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused, in reference to the charge,
deprives him of that freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law.
Id. at 585. While the Hopt holding incorporated the voluntariness doctrine into federal law, such was not the case with state law. Because the doctrine was adopted as a
federal evidentiary rule, it was not binding upon the states. It was not until 1936, in
Brown, 297 U.S. at 278, that the voluntariness doctrine adopted in Hopt shed its
evidentiary nature and assumed a constitutional dimension which then imposed the
voluntariness doctrine upon the states. Id.
8. 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
9. Id. at 518.
10. Id. at 522.
11. Id. at 521.

19871

Colorado v. ConneUy

On August 18, 1983, Connelly approached a police officer and
stated that he wanted to discuss a murder which he had committed."' The officer immediately read Connelly his Miranda rights."5
After acknowledging that he understood his rights,1 ' Connelly recounted the details of the murder and took the officers to the murder scene.1 5 The next day, in an interview at the public defender's
office, Connelly became "visibly disoriented" and stated that he confessed to the murder under the direction of "voices" which told him
to either confess or commit suicide." Following this interview, a
state psychiatrist examined Connelly and diagnosed him as mentally
incompetent.1 7 The state doctors treated Connelly until March 18,
1984, when they considered him competent to stand trial.'8
At the preliminary hearing, Connelly moved to have his confession suppressed.19 The court-appointed psychiatrist testified that
Connelly was suffering from chronic schizophrenia and had been in
a psychotic state at the time of his confession. 0 The doctor further
testified that Connelly's auditory hallucinations rendered him incapable of making free and rational choices.2 In the doctor's opinion,
12. Id. at 518.
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda Court established
procedural rules that protect a suspect during custodial interrogation. Specifically,
the Miranda rules require that
[pirior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Id. at 444. Statements obtained in violation of the Miranda rules are inadmissible as
evidence. Id.
14. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 518.
15. Id. The lack of corroborating evidence in support of Connelly's statements
is a critical factor not discussed by the Connelly Court which goes to the heart of the
question of the reliability of Connelly's confession. Connelly stated that he had murdered a young girl in the Denver area in November of 1982. Id. After checking their
files, the police found that the body of an unidentified girl was discovered in April
1983. Id. The police were unable, however, to verify that the unidentified girl was the
woman named by the defendant. Id. at 530 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, there
was no physical evidence which could implicate Connelly in the murder of the unidentified girl. Id. These facts contribute to the uncertainty of the reliability of Connelly's confession, but were never considered by the Court.
16. Id. at 518-19. Connelly believed that he was the reincarnation of Jesus and
that the voice he heard was the voice of God. Id. at 526 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
17. Id. at 519.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. Concerning Connelly's hallucinations, the doctor testified that at the
time Connelly was read his Miranda rights, he "probably had the capacity to know
that he was being read his Miranda rights, [but] he wasn't able to use the information because of the command hallucinations that he had experienced." Id. at 526
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 1 Record 56-57).
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Connelly's psychosis provoked his confession.2 2 Based on this testi-

mony, the Colorado trial court, while finding no police misconduct,
determined that the defendant's mental illness destroyed his voli-

tional ability and compelled him to confess.22 Consequently, the
court held that Connelly's statements were involuntary and inad-

missible.2 ' The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
holding." The court held that the presence or absence of police coercion is not determinative of voluntariness and that a suspect's rational judgment and free will may be overborne by mental illness.2
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari27 in order
to address the issue of whether, in the absence of police coercion, a

confession is involuntary under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment when the confessor's mental illness has impaired
his rational judgment and free will." The Court reversed the Colorado Supreme Court and held that police coercion is a prerequisite

of involuntariness 2 and that a defendant's deficient mental condition, on its own, is never conclusive of voluntariness. 30
The Court began its reasoning by asserting that the due process

clause of the fourteenth amendment protects suspects from offensive interrogation techniques.2 The Court noted that it first applied
the due process clause to state confession cases in 1936,2 in Brown

v. Mississippi," as a response to torturous interrogation techniques.
In Brown, interrogators tortured the suspects until they confessed.,
22. Id. at 519.
23. Id.
24. Id. In reaching its decision, the trial court relied on Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293 (1963). See infra notes 91-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Townsend.
25. Colorado v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985).
26. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 519.
27. Colorado v. Connelly, 106 S. Ct. 785 (1986).
28. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 518.
29. Id. at 522.
30. Id. at 521.
31. Id. at 520.
32. Before 1936, the Court had no authority in state confession law. Federal
evidentiary rules did not, and still do not, apply to the states. Furthermore, the fifth
amendment privilege against self incrimination was not imposed on the states until
1964, in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). In 1936, in Brown v. Mississippi, 297
U.S. 278 (1936), the Court established the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment as the basis for its authority in state confession law. See M. BERGER,
TAKING THE FIFTH 104-05 (1980).
33. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
34. Id. at 282-83. In Brown, three defendants were accused and convicted of
murder. Id. at 279. All of the defendants claimed to be innocent. Id. The first defendant was hanged from a tree, released, and hanged again to force a confession from
him. Id. at 281. Still claiming innocence, the man was then tied to the tree and
whipped until he finally confessed. Id. The interrogators forced the remaining two
defendants to strip and then whipped them with a buckle attached to a leather strap.
Id. at 282. These two also confessed. Id.

1987]

Colorado v. Connelly

The Brown Court held that Brown's confession was involuntary because the methods used to extract the confession were so offensive
to traditional notions of justice that they violated the defendant's
right to due process."' After noting that all of its confession cases
since Brown have exhibited some element of police coercion, the
Connelly Court concluded that the due process analysis applied only
to coercive state activity.3" Consequently, the Court held that absent
police coercion "causally related to the confession," there is no basis
for declaring a confession involuntary under the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment.3"
Although the Court held that a finding of involuntariness requires the existence of police coercion, the Court conceded that the
defendant's mental condition is a significant factor in the determination of voluntariness."8 The Court qualified the significance of the
35. Id. at 286. The Brown Court specifically held that "[t]he due process clause
requires 'that state action, whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent
with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions.'" Id. (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316
(1926)). The Brown Court further held that "the use of the confessions thus obtained
as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process." Id. (emphasis added). Two important factors concerning this holding should be noted: first,
the Brown Court focused on the requirement of fundamental fairness generally, not
on police coercion specifically; second, the Court confirms that the due process requirements are applicable to all state agencies ("whether through one state agency or
another") and not just the police department. Id. The Connelly holding, restricting
due process violations to police coercion, directly conflicts with the more comprehensive and demanding nature of the Brown holding.
36. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520. Neither precedent nor logic support the Court's
conclusion. The Court based this conclusion on the observation that all past confession cases include some element of police coercion. Id. Logically, the Court cannot
validly assume that a factor is a requirement for involuntariness simply because the
factor appears in all past confession cases. While it is true, especially in the earliest
confession cases in which police brutality was blatant and severe, that police coercion
was determinative in calculating voluntariness, the Court never before regarded this
factor as conditional to involuntariness. The Connelly Court misinterpreted the determinative nature of coercion in the past cases as indicating that coercion is a precondition to involuntariness.
37. Id. at 519.
38. Id. at 520. It is significant that the Court relies on Spano v. New York, 360
U.S. 315 (1959), in conceding that mental capacity has become more significant in the
voluntariness calculation. While Spano considered the mental capacity of the defendant, id. at 322, the case is primarily recognized for the deceptive methods used to
elicit the defendant's confession. In fact, the Spano Court did not even mention
mental capacity when it concluded that the defendant's "will was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused ....
" Id. at 323. The effect of
the Connely Court's use of Spano is to minimize the true significance of mental
capacity in the voluntariness test. In effect, the Connelly Court conveniently neglected to cite holdings more indicative of the significance of mental capacity in the
voluntariness equation. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (confession
involuntary because the defendant was under the influence of a medication which
affected his mental capabilities); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (defendant's confession ruled involuntary due to his insanity at the time of the confession);
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (defendant's weak mind contributed to his
inability to resist questioning).
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defendant's mental state, however, by holding that mental condition, in and of itself, is not dispositive of the due process inquiry. 9
In drawing this conclusion, the Court refuted the respondent's contention that in both Blackburn v. Alabama 0 and Townsend v.
Sain", the defendants' mental states were determinative of a finding of involuntariness. The Connelly Court held that while the defendants' mental states were highly significant in those cases, the
evidence of police overreaching was the "integral" element in finding
the confessions involuntary. 42 The Court concluded that requiring
police coercion for a finding of involuntariness was consistent with
4
settled law. '
An analysis of Connelly in light of the voluntariness rationale
and settled confession law reveals three flaws in the Court's holding.
The first and most significant defect in the Connelly holding is that
it is founded on the Court's misconception of the role of due process
in confession law. The Connelly Court incorrectly limited violations
of the due process clause to incidents of state coercion. The second
flaw in the Connelly holding is that it undermines the original objective of the voluntariness doctrine, which is to ensure the reliability
of evidence. Finally, while claiming to have followed settled confession law, the Court blatantly misinterpreted and misapplied precedent in an effort to justify its holding. These defects support the
conclusion that the Court's reasoning in ConneUy fails to substantiate the unprecedented requirement of police coercion for a finding
of involuntariness.
In order to properly assess the merits of the Connelly holding,
it is essential to understand the rationale underlying the voluntariness doctrine. When the American courts adopted the concept of
voluntariness from the English common law," the courts used the
concept only as a rule of admissibility necessary to ensure the relia39. Connelly, 107 S Ct. at 521. To buttress this conclusion, the Court noted that
a holding in favor of Connelly would require the Court to "establish a brand new
constitutional right" that would force the court to make "inquiries into the state of
mind of a criminal defendant who has confessed." Id. at 521-22. The Court's line of
reasoning in this section is particularly perplexing because the Court seems to suggest
that in the past the Court ignored the defendant's state of mind. In fact, the very

nature of the Court's own test for voluntariness, requiring a free will and rationale
intellect, necessitates an inquiry into the state of mind of the defendant. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960). "The inquiry most . . .consistently made in
the voluntariness cases has been into the defendant's state of mind at the time a
challenged confession was made." Confessions, supra note 7, at 973.

40. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).
41.
42.
43.

372 U.S. 293 (1963).
Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520-21.
Id. at 521.

44. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the history of the concept of
voluntariness.
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bility of evidence.4 If a confession was not voluntary, the courts
presumed it was unreliable"4 and, therefore, inadmissible as evidence.4 7 As American courts became more concerned with fairness in
extrajudicial procedures, the voluntariness rationale acquired a constitutional focus. 4 8 In 1936, in Brown v. Mississippi, 4" the Court held
45. Because the American courts adopted the voluntariness doctrine as a federal rule of evidence, the rule could not be enforced on the states. It was only after
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), that the doctrine finally applied to the
states.
46. This assumption is based on the belief that, under coercion, a defendant
will offer a confession not because he is guilty, but because he is trying to spare himself the discomfort of a prolonged, possibly painful, interrogation. MCCORMICK, supra

note 2, at 372.
47. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
48. The Court's shift to a constitutional focus in confession law is generally attributed to the historical preference in America for an accusatorial, as opposed to an
inquisitorial, system of justice. The accusatory system is the "[s]ystem of American
jurisprudence in which the government accuses and bears the burden of proving the
guilt of a person for a crime; to be distinguished from inquisitorial system." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 21 (5th ed. 1979). In Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), the
Court noted that the
determination to preserve an accused's right to procedural due process sprang
in large part from knowledge of the historical truth that the rights and liberties
of people accused of crime could not be safely entrusted to secret inquisitorial
processes. The testimony of centuries, in governments of varying kinds over
populations of different races and beliefs, stood as proof that physical and
mental torture and coercion had brought about the tragically unjust sacrifices
of some who were the noblest and most useful of their generations. The rack,
the thumbscrew, the wheel, solitary confinement, protracted questioning and
cross questioning, and other ingenious forms of entrapment of the helpless or
unpopular had left their wake of mutilated bodies and shattered minds along
the way to the cross, the guillotine, the stake and the hangman's noose. And
they who have suffered most from secret and dictatorial proceedings have almost always been the poor, the ignorant, the numerically weak, the friendless,
and the powerless.
Id. at 237-38.
The shift that occurred in confession law in 1936 was not solely due to the American ideal of the accusatorial system of justice. 0. STEPHENS, JR., THE SUPREME COURT
AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 37-49 (1973). In addition, and probably more immediately
significant at the time, was the social and political atmosphere of the day. Id. One of
the more serious issues facing America in 1936 was the uncontrolled, brutal nature of
police interrogations. Id. In 1931, the National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement published the Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement (1931) (commonly known as the Wickersham Report), in which the committee reported the widespread use of the "third degree" in police interrogations. Id. at 1-33. Studies also
showed that police brutality against poor black citizens was particulary severe. STEPHENS, supra, at 36-38. The revelations of police brutality raised anew doubts concerning the adequacy of procedural safeguards in state criminal procedure.
Other social realities of the time may also have contributed to the Court's shift to
a position of more control in state procedures. Id. at 39-42. Among other factors that
may have influenced the Brown Court were the growing interest in social and political
reform, the growth in organized crime in the 1920's and the rise of the totalitarian
regimes in Russia, Italy, and, finally, in Germany. Id. Consequently, in addition to
the Court's preference for an accusatorial system of justice, its decision in Brown was
likely influenced by the myriad of social and political factors of the time which inspired procedural reform aimed at achieving greater control over police activity and
the states' criminal process.
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that in order for a confession to be admissible, the actions of the
state5" must conform to traditional notions of justice as required by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 51 Since 1936,
then, the objectives of the voluntariness doctrine have been twofold:
to ensure reliability of evidence and to prevent unfairness in the use
of confessions. The holding in Connelly is inconsistent with both of
these objectives.
The most serious flaw in the Connelly holding is that it is
founded on a misconception of the role of due process in confession
law. The purpose of due process is to guarantee procedural standards5 ' which will prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of confessions. 53 Connelly, however, restricts the application of due process to incidents of state coercion."" This restriction cannot be
reconciled with the nature of the voluntariness doctrine or with the
Court's own tests for voluntariness.
The essence of the voluntariness doctrine demands that the due
process guarantee of fundamental fairness embrace more than mere
protection from police coercion. 55 Because the Court has long recognized voluntariness as the procedural standard for the admission of
a confession into evidence," a confession is only admissible under
49. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
50. The actions of the state that are subject to the due process requirements
include the actions of all state agencies, not just the police department. See supra
note 35 for a case citation and further explanation of this point.
51. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
52. The fourteenth amendment "was intended to guarantee procedural standards adequate and appropriate, then and thereafter, to protect, at all times, people
charged with or suspected of crime by those holding positions of power and authority." Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 236 (1940) (footnote omitted).
53. In Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941), the Court distinguished the
exclusionary rule of the voluntariness doctrine from the role of due process in confession law:
The aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was voluntarily
made is to exclude false evidence ....

The aim of the requirement of due

process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.
Id. at 236. While the aim of due process is still to prevent fundamental unfairness,
the distinction between the role of due process and the role of the exclusionary rule
of the voluntariness doctrine has substantially diminished. Confessions, supra note 7,
at 961.
54. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 520 (1986).
55. In Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), when the Court merged the
due process requirements with the voluntariness doctrine, it did not limit due process
to state coercion. Rather, the Court applied the requirements to "state action" in
general. Id. at 286. In fact, the Brown Court held that "the use of [coerced] confessions ... as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process."
Id. (emphasis added). Consequently, the Connelly Court undermined the intentions
of the Brown Court by restricting violations of the due process clause to incidents of
state coercion.
56. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 540-43 (1897) (admission of defendant's involuntary statements would constitute reversible error); Hopt v. Utah,
110 U.S. 574 (1884) (involuntary confessions are inadmissible).
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the due process clause if it satisfies the voluntariness test. The voluntariness test, which requires that a confession be the product of

free will and rational choice, 5 7 is not satisfied, as the Connelly Court
contends, simply because a confession is offered in the absence of

police coercion.58 Rather, a confession must reflect a free exercise of
the defendant's will and intellect 8s Therefore, a confession that is
not voluntary in fact, regardless of the presence or absence of police
coercion, must be considered involuntary and inadmissible under
the due process clause. 0 Connelly, which deems any confession vol-

untary if it is not coerced by the state, is inconsistent with this
conclusion.
The Connelly Court's narrow interpretation of the role of due
process is not only inconsistent with the essence of the voluntariness
doctrine, it also undermines the Court's own tests for fundamental
fairness and voluntariness. The unique nature of each confession
case has prevented the Court from defining specific due process requirements applicable to all situations." Instead, in evaluating fun57. Blackburn v. Alabama, 316 U.S. 199, 207-08 (1960).
58. In the earliest confession cases, the voluntariness test focused, by necessity,
on police brutality. The more sophisticated tactics used by modern day police require
a more sophisticated voluntariness test; one not determined merely on the basis of
police coercion. Confessions, supra note 7, at 973-75. Thus, the modern voluntariness
test should include consideration of "whether the pressures exerted by the police or
the mental state of the defendant proved too great an obstacle to the defendant's
exercise of his own judgement." Id. at 974. (Emphasis in original).
59. In Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), the Court determined that
"a confession is not voluntary merely because it is the 'product of sentient choice,' if
it does not reflect a free exercise of the defendant's will." Id. at 803 (citing Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 606 (1948)). In an earlier case, Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961),
the Court noted that "whether a confession was extracted by coercion does not depend simply upon whether the police resorted to the crude tactic of deliberate physical abuse .... The question in each case is whether a defendant's will was overborne
at the time he confessed." Id. at 440.
60. The Court in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), confirmed the fact that
a confession which is not the product of free intellect is inadmissible. Id. at 307-09.
Similarly, in Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924), the Court held that
"the requisite of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by a promise or threat. A confession is voluntary if, and only if,
it was, in fact, voluntarily made." Id. at 14.
61. The problem of precisely defining voluntariness has plagued the United
States Supreme Court since its first confession case in 1884. In Hopt v. Utah, 110
U.S. 574 (1884), the Court noted that the admissibility of confessions "so largely depends upon the special circumstances connected with the confession, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a rule that will comprehend all cases." Id. at 583.
In reference to the interrogation procedures used by the police, the Supreme Court,
in Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961), conceded that it "is impossible for
this Court, in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, to attempt precisely to delimit,
or to surround with specific, all-inclusive restrictions, the power of interrogation allowed to state law enforcement officers in obtaining confessions. No single litmuspaper test for constitutionally impermissible interrogation has been evolved .
Id. at 601.
The Supreme Court did attempt to devise specific requirements for the admissibility of confessions. In Mcnabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), the Court held
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damental fairness, the Court relies on general tests, such as whether,
given the "totality of circumstances," 62 the defendant's will was
"overborne" e at the time of the confession. 4 Under this test, if a
defendant's will is overborne, the confession is considered involuntary and is inadmissible under the due process clause. 5 The unrestrictive nature of this inquiry necessarily precludes reliance on a
single, mandatory requirement, such as police coercion, for a finding
of involuntariness. In fact, until Connelly, the Court never evaluated
fundamental fairness or determined voluntariness in light of a single, controlling criterion. e Having adopted such a standard in Connelly, the Court has effectively rendered impotent its own test for
that a confession could be excluded if it was obtained after an unnecessary delay in
presenting the defendant before a magistrate. This federal rule of procedure, however, was not applicable to the states. Subsequently, in Malloy v. United States, 354
U.S. 449 (1957), the Court expanded this rule to include unnecessary delays for the
purpose of conducting an interrogation. Through Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), the Court introduced specific procedural requirements for custodial interrogations into state procedure. See supra note 13 for a discussion of Miranda.The Court
hoped that the specific requirements of Miranda would render the voluntariness test,
with all its ambiguities, obsolete. See M. BERGER, TAKING THE FIFTH 125-160 (1980).
See also Dix, supra note 4, at 295-300. The reality is that the voluntariness test is
needed as much after Miranda as before. Any rights waived by a suspect, including
Miranda rights, must be waived voluntarily. In addition, even if a suspect waives his
Miranda rights, any subsequent confession must be shown to have been voluntary.
Dix, supra note 4, at 298-99. Consequently, the Court's efforts to replace the voluntariness doctrine, while somewhat successful on the federal level, have proven futile on
the state level.
62. Among the factors considered in the totality of circumstances test are the
age of the suspect, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600 (1948), his level of education,
e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958), limited intelligence, e.g., Fikes v.
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 193 (1957), length of detention and psychological coercion,
e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 230-32 (1940), repeated and lengthy interrogation, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-54 (1944), and the deprivation of
food and sleep, e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1961).
63. In determining whether a confession is inadmissible because the defendant's
will was overborne, the
ultimate test remains that which has been the only clearly established test in
Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the
confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its
maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess, it may be used against him. If it is
not, if his will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of his confession offends due process. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961). The line of distinction is that at which governing
self-direction is lost and compulsion, of whatever nature or however infused,
propels or helps to propel the confession.
Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
64. The general tests used by the Court, until Connelly, considered all factors
relevant, but none determinative. Dix, supra note 4, at 293. The result is that the
Court has escaped the responsibility of ruling on the significance of any one factor in
the voluntariness equation. Consequently, the general nature of the tests have only
contributed to the ambiguity that characterizes confession law. See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 4, at 557-59.
65. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S.
568, 602 (1961).
66. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
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determining fundamental fairness and voluntariness.
The effect of the Connelly Court's misconception of the role of
due process in confession law will be to deny defendants, such as
Connelly, due process in the use of their confessions. At the time of
his confession, Connelly suffered from mental disorders that prevented him from making free and rational choices.67 Under the
Court's own test, Connelly's will was overborne and his confession
involuntary because his mental illness prevented him from exercising a free will and rational intellect.6 8 Yet, according to the Connelly
Court, the' absence of state coercion enables a state to admit a defendant's involuntary confession into evidence."s Such an admission
would deny Connelly due process 70 by violating the procedural due
71
process requirements of the voluntariness doctrine.
The second defect in the Connelly holding is that it frustrates
the original objective 72 of the voluntariness doctrine by allowing the
admission of unreliable confessions into evidence. In effect, the Connelly holding permits the admissibility of all unreliable confessions
that are not the product of police coercion.72 Consequently, absent
state coercion, the confession of a psychotic, intoxicated, drugged, or
67. Connelly v. Colorado, 107 S. Ct. 515, 526 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
68. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
69. Specifically, the Connelly Court held that "the admissibility of this kind of
statement is governed by state rules of evidence, rather than by our previous decisions regarding coerced confessions .... Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 518. Consequently,
while a defendant will not receive constitutional protection from an unreliable but
uncoerced confession, local evidentiary rules still may exclude the confession.
70. The denial of due process is particularly nefarious when the defendant, like
Connelly, is so mentally incapable that he cannot effectively exercise his rights. In
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960), the Court reflected this attitude when it
passionately noted that "[s]urely in the present stage of our civilization a most basic
sense of justice is affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a human being upon the
basis of a statement he made while insane .
I..."
Id. at 207. In Confessions, supra
note 7, at 977, the author, in contemplation of a proper standard for voluntariness,
observes that "it would seem that the definition of the standard should logically bear
some relation to the suspect's ability to cope with the situation in which he finds
himself." Because mentally ill defendants, like Connelly, are unable to cope with an
interrogation effectively enough to protect themselves, the use of their confessions
clearly offends traditional notions of justice.
71. In Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), the Court established that the
use of an involuntary confession "for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of
due process." Id. at 286. Also, in Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958), the Court
held that where a confession did not constitute an exercise of free will, "its use before
the jury ... deprived [the defendant] of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the
very concept of justice'.
Id. at 567 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219,
236 (1941)).
72. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the original objective of the voluntariness doctrine.
73. Because the Connelly Court only permits state coerced confessions to be
considered involuntary within the meaning of the voluntariness doctrine, all other
unreliable confessions will be excluded from the admissibility requirements of the
doctrine. Consequently, absent a local law to the contrary, any unreliable confession
that is not the product of state coercion may be admitted into evidence.
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juvenile defendant, as well as confessions coerced by third parties,
may be admissible despite their highly questionable reliability.74
A brief analysis of the rationale of the voluntariness doctrine
supports the conclusion that the concern for the reliability of confessions should not be restricted to police coerced confessions. The voluntariness doctrine was founded on the premise that involuntary
confessions are unreliable.7 1 Connelly established that only police
coerced confessions are involuntary7 and, therefore, only police coerced confessions can be considered unreliable within the meaning
of the voluntariness doctrine. This result is unacceptable. Because
reliability is determined by voluntariness and voluntariness is determined by the ability to exercise free will and rational judgment,"
Connelly implies that only police coercion can impair a defendant's
free will and judgment. Empirical evidence suggests, however, that a
78
variety of factors induce involuntary and unreliable confessions.

It

is not logical, therefore, to restrict involuntariness to police coerced
confessions. Such a restriction directly conflicts with the objective of
the voluntariness doctrine of ensuring the reliability of evidence.
Connelly's predicament is empirical proof that the Court's holding does not properly address the reliability rationale of the voluntariness doctrine. The state psychiatrist diagnosed Connelly as incompetent, psychotic, schizophrenic, and incapable of consistently
relating facts at the time of his confession. 9 The psychiatrist further
testified that Connelly was unable to make free and rational
choices.80 In this condition, Connelly was highly susceptible to offering unreliable statements and, therefore, was most deserving of constitutional protection. Nevertheless, because his confession was not
the product of police coercion, Connelly was denied this protection
and the state court was permitted to admit his confession despite its
unreliable nature. Consequently, the Connelly holding has undermined the rationale of the voluntariness concept by increasing the
likelihood that unreliable confessions will be admitted as evidence.
74. For a discussion of the legal effect of a confession from a drugged or intoxicated suspect, see W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS 15153 (1972).

75. See supra note 7 for a discussion of the foundation of the voluntariness
doctrine.
76. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 522 (1986).
77. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
78. For example, a suspect who has been drugged or intoxicated against his own

will or knowledge might be incapable of exercising a free will and rational judgment
despite the absence of police coercion.
79. Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515, 519, 526 (1986). In addition, Connelly
had been hospitalized for psychiatric treatment five times. Id. at 526 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, while doctors treated Connelly "with a variety of medications
in the past including antipsychotic medications," Connelly had not received any medication in the six months prior to his confession. Id.
80. Id. at 526.
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The third flaw in the Connelly holding is that the Court, while
professing to have followed settled confession law,8 ' clearly parted
with precedent. The backbone of Connelly's case consisted of two
major precedents: Blackburn v. Alabama 2 and Townsend v. Sain.83
Unable to dispose of these cases as inapposite, the Court was forced
to manipulate the holdings to justify its conclusion that police coercion is required for a finding of involuntariness. 4
In Blackburn, the defendant suffered from mental illness and
was diagnosed as incompetent and schizophrenic. 5 The defendant,
like Connelly, was hospitalized until he was competent to stand
trial.8 6 The defendant's confession, offered after eight hours of inter87
rogation in a small room, was ruled involuntary and inadmissible.
The Connelly Court misinterpreted the Blackburn decision as dependent on the "integral element" of police overreaching.8 A careful
reading of Blackburn discounts this contention. The Blackburn
Court actually held that the defendant's confession was involuntary
because the defendant lacked "rational choice. 8 9 As an afterthought, the Court noted that the elements of police overreaching
only made worse the denial of due process.90 The clear implication is
that the mental deficiency of the defendant was enough to render
his confession involuntary. This conclusion is supported by precedent. In Townsend v. Sain," the Court stated, in reference to Blackburn, that it "held irrelevant the absence of evidence of improper
81. Id. at 521.
82. 361 U.S. 199 (1960).

83. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
84. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522.
85. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 200-01. Blackburn had a history of mental illness.
Id. In 1944, Blackburn had been discharged from the army as permanently disabled
by psychosis. Id. at 200. Blackburn was charged with a robbery which occurred while
he was absent without permission from a mental ward. Id at 201.
86. Id. at 202.
87. Id. at 204.
88. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 520 (1960).
89. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207.
90. Id at 207-08. The Blackburn Court specifically found that
the strongest probability that Blackburn was insane and incompetent at the
time he allegedly confessed. Surely in the present stage of our civilization a
most basic sense of justice is affronted by the spectacle of incarcerating a
human being upon the basis of a statement he made while insane; and this
judgment can without difficulty be articulated in terms of the unreliability of
the confession, the lack of rational choice of the accused, or simply a strong
conviction that our system of law enforcement should not operate so as to take
advantage of person in this fashion. And when other pertinent circumstances
are considered ... the chances of the confessions' having been the product of
a rational intellect and a free will become even more remote and the denial of
due process even more egregious.
Id. See also Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (confession of a defendant with a
low mentality held involuntary).
91. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
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Nevertheless, the

Connelly Court overlooked this interpretation of Blackburn in favor
of a construction more suited to its conclusion; police coercion is
necessary for a finding of involuntariness.
The Connelly Court again engaged in a form of creative interpretation to dispose of Townsend. In Townsend, the defendant was
given medication, while in custody, to keep him calm. 93 Shortly

thereafter, the defendant responded to the officers' questions and
confessed. The interrogating officers were not told that the drug administered to the defendant could have the effect of truth serum. 4

Because the officers were unaware of the drug's special qualities, the
Court found no police impropriety. Nevertheless, the Townsend
Court ruled that the defendant's statements were involuntary because they were not "the product of free intellect." 15 The Court
held that the absence of police impropriety was insignificant and
that any confession which is "in fact" involuntary is inadmissible."
The Connelly Court blatantly ignored this holding97 and, instead,
reasoned that the presence of police overreaching in both Townsend
and Blackburn supports the conclusion that police coercion is a requirement for a finding of involuntariness.

The unfavorable consequences of the Connelly holding will extend beyond the case itself to infect both criminal procedure in general and confession law in particular. In criminal procedure, the
Connelly holding will prove detrimental to the integrity of the fact
finding process. One of the effects of the Connelly holding will be to
make more likely the introduction of unreliable confessions into evidence. Once a confession is in evidence, the burden of evaluating
reliability rests with the jury. Yet, given the irrepressible power of a
confession, however unreliable, to bias the mind of the trier of fact
92. Id. at 309. The Townsend Court specifically noted, in reference to the holding in Blackburn, "that we judged the confession inadmissible because the
probability was that the defendant was in fact insane at the time." Id.
93. The medication was hyoscine which can have the effect of truth serum. Id.
at 308.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. The Court emphasized that it would be
difficult to imagine a situation in which a confession would be less the product
of a free intellect, less voluntary, than when brought about by a drug having
the effect of a "truth serum." It is not significant that the drug may have been
administered and the questions asked by persons unfamiliar with hyoscine's
properties as a "truth serum," if these properties exist. Any questioning by
police officers which in fact produces a confession which is not the product of a
free intellect renders that confession inadmissible.
Id. (Emphasis in original).
97. In fact, the Connelly Court actually referred to the conduct of the police
officers in both Townsend and Blackburn as "police wrongdoing" despite the fact
that the holdings of both of these cases clearly state that there was no police impropriety. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 521.
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and to seal the fate of the defendant, the ability of the jury to objectively determine guilt or innocence will effectively be diminished.
In addition to undermining the fact finding process, the Connelly holding will also have a detrimental effect on confession law.
Prior to Connelly, confession law suffered from ambiguity. In the
wake of Connelly, this ambiguity deteriorated into incomprehensibility. While claiming to follow settled confession law, the Connelly
Court struck out on its own and created an unprecedented standard
for involuntariness; the existance of police coercion. This unjustified
requirement has altered the voluntariness test of free will and rational judgment to a test for police coercion. Such a test is contrary
to precedent and to the objectives of the voluntariness doctrine.
Consequently, in its effort to clarify the doctrine of voluntariness,
the Connelly Court succeeded only in contributing to the confusion
that pervades confession law by gratuitously linking involuntariness
and state coercion.
James P. Byrne, Jr.

